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 We analyse how transparency initiatives shape elite dynamics in the extractive sector. 
 The centrality of elites is linked with networks of power and domination that influences governance 
trajectories in the wake of commodity booms. 
 The EITI is associated with the emergence of a governance complex that simultaneously  legitmises 




Implicit in the predominant dogma that upholds transparency as the panacea for the ill-effects of 
resource endowment is a belief that public disclosure undermines the predatory landscape for elite 
patronage and clientelistic politics. Nonetheless, there is surprisingly little empirical information 
about how reforms geared towards promoting transparency impinge on elite behaviour in resource-
rich countries. Focusing on the experience of EITI implementation in Ghana’s oil industry, this 
article addresses this gap by foregrounding institutions of transparency on the distinctive patterns 
of elite choices and behavior in the wake of commodity booms in low-income countries. It pieces 
together primary field data that were compiled between 2013 and 2016, along with heuristic tools 
drawn from elite and network theories to make sense of how the EITI and associated institutional 
innovations influence elite behavior and its ramifications for oil-led development.  Our findings 
associate the EITI with the evolving governance complex that has concurrently offered 
opportunities to incorporate other actors into policy reforms and legitimize elite 
instrumentalization.  This is used to highlight the negative effects of Ghana’s inherent ‘winner-
takes-all’ politics on the governance of oil and the limits of technocratic reforms in altering elite 
incentives in resource-rich countries. 
  
 









Subject to characterizations of the ‘resource curse’, which explains the differentiated 
evidence around the correlation between resource abundance and socio-economic development, 
resource-rich countries have been keen to avoid some of the negative outcomes of extraction 
(Auty, 1993; see also Okpanachi & Andrews, 2012). In addition to economic indicators such as 
diversification, quality institutions particularly remain key among the factors that are expected to 
determine the extent to which a country will be ‘cursed’ or ‘blessed’ by its resource endowment 
(Mehlum et al., 2006; de Medeiros Costa et al., 2013). The Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) has emerged as a global standard that supports and advances the institutional 
innovation needed to address issues around corruption, transparency and accountability. Its 
normative underpinnings and promised potential of changing the state of affairs in member 
countries have resulted in many scholarly contributions that have examined the relationship 
between the EITI and a variety of themes such as good governance, transparency, social 
accountability and the resource curse itself (see Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Haufler, 2010; Sovacool 
et al., 2016; David‐Barrett & Okamura, 2016; Öge, 2017; van Alstine, 2017; Oppong, 2018).  
          Does transparency matter? This is an important question which is utilized by Sovacool and 
Andrews (2015) to critique the fetishism of transparency as the panacea to the challenges that 
resource-rich countries encounter and the expectation that once the ‘iron curtains’ that, hitherto, 
covered extractive rents are opened, things will subsequently be better (see also Haufler, 2010). 
Another related question is, does information matter? Since financial disclosure is central to EITI 
implementation, this question has been recently posed by experts who have sought to examine the 
extent to which the availability of information on resource rents and revenue management results 
in improved accountability (Brunnschweiler et al., 2019). In both instances, it is difficult to draw 
a correlation between overt openness or disclosure and improved governance and accountability 
metrics – which underscores the illusionary nature of some of the claims around what the EITI can 
achieve (Ofori & Lujala, 2015) as well as the simplistic nature of the transparency narrative in 
natural resource governance and management (Kasimba & Lujala, 2019). Both points also 
underpin the existence of what Öge (2017) refers to as ‘transparent autocracies’, which explains 
how proactive EITI implementation in places such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan can co-exist with 
government mechanisms towards co-optation and oppression of civil society organizations 
(CSOs). 
 While the two questions raised by the literature so far remain important, they do not provide 
us with an empirical account of how transparency norms have shaped elite dynamics in specific 
extractive sector domains. Indeed, the extant literature emphasizes the importance of information 
disclosure in transforming elite dynamics from predation – i.e. patronage, clientelism, 
authoritarianism, and corruption (Brunnschweiler et al. 2019; see also Kolstad & Wiig 2009; 
Haufler 2010; Öge 2017a) – but falls short of demonstrating how governance instruments such as 
the EITI enables this to happen. Elsewhere (see Hazelton, 2017), the good governance logic is 
seen to characterize ‘unexamined assumptions’ based on the expectation that certain measures (i.e. 
governance reforms) are inherently good for institutional change while the reality is that this is 
often not the case. This point also sheds light on the extant African politics literature that highlight 
the role of political elites in circumventing governance reform pressures (van de Walle, 2003; 
Lindberg, 2007; de Oliveira, 2011). While the literature is enriched with accounts of the role of 
elites in undermining optimum change or institutionalising what de Oliveira (2007) and van de 
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Walle (2001) have described as the partial reform syndrome which can be seen as a characteristic 
of ‘illiberal democracies’, there is more room to explore their sectoral and contextual dynamics.   
          On the EITI, in particular, transparency as an idea is often deployed in passive terms. It is 
usually represented as a norm that does good, irrespective of contextual variations, without much 
clarity (see Sovacool & Andrews, 2015; van Alstine, 2017). Consequently, we know how 
transparency norms emerge and diffuse from global to the local, without much attention paid to 
how elites condition their translation into domestic governance instruments. At the elite level, 
much has been written about motivation for compliance and dynamics of implementation or non-
implementation (see David‐Barrett & Okamura, 2016; Öge, 2017b; Oppong, 2018), but the 
connections between such compliance dynamics and the broader impact of reform on elite 
incentives remain largely untouched. 
          To address the noted gaps in the extant literature, the paper employs elite theory and social 
network theory to develop an analysis that offers some explanations of how the EITI and associated 
institutional innovations shape elite incentives and behaviour. Focussing on Ghana’s oil industry, 
our goal in this article is two-fold: First, we offer an empirical account of the elite dynamics and 
the distinctive politics of reform that characterised the boom period, which began with the 
announcement of commercial oil find in 2007 . Secondly, the paper underscores the importance of 
elite theory and social network theory in making sense of the distinctive politics of restructuring 
petroleum. Our core argument situates the EITI in the emergence of a governance complex that 
escalated in the wake of the oil boom. This complex, as expounded further below, is marked by a 
duplicity and proliferation of new regimes of regulation and private governance networks, which 
have posed significant constraints on elites. However, by failing to address power imbalances the 
EITI has served as a crucial instrument of elite domination and legitimation. Thus, despite an 
impressive record, EITI implementation has not altered the incentive patterns underpinning elite 
politics in Ghana’s oil industry. To explore the theoretical and empirical essence of this 
phenomenon, the next section of the paper provides the theoretical basis for our argument to be 
followed by a brief discussion of methods of data collection. The bulk of the analysis is devoted 
to an examination of the governance complex within which the EITI operates as well as the 
manifestations of the factors underpinning elite politics and instrumentalization.  
 
Theorizing Elites Networks in the Extractive Sector  
  
While the political economy scholarship has established the centrality of elites in the 
politics of reform (Nye, 2011; Robinson, 2010), its theoretical implications for resource 
governance have not been developed more explicitly. Against the grim prognosis advanced by the 
‘resource curse’ thesis, the politics of reform have been rightly pivoted on the goal of altering the 
perverse environment around which elites operate. To firmly grasp how the EITI as an instrument 
of reform shapes elite dynamics in Ghana petroleum sector, our analysis employs a web of heuristic 
tools drawn from elite theory and social network theory. Our view of elites aligns with what 
DiCaprio (2012:4) has defined as ‘a distinct group within a society which enjoys privileged status 
and exercises decisive control over the organization of society.’ This conception departs from 
earlier interpretations which upheld elites in absolute terms, based on designation of official titles, 
and links elitism with positions of power that are contingent on interaction with different actors. 
Elite dynamics are, therefore, embedded in a much broader network of socio-economic and 
political processes that define different power configurations and governance outcomes (see 
Wong, 2012) . Social network theory offers an important lens through which we could gain a 
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deeper understanding of the centrality of elites, along with the values, precedents, instructions and 
the dynamics of multiple structures that mediate their interactions with non-elites (cf. Bodin & 
Crona, 2009:335). 
          Network approaches have enjoyed a measure of ubiquity in the social sciences. In the 
extractive sector, its invocation has mostly focused on the understanding and organisation of 
collaborative governance processes that challenge top-down approaches to the management of 
various resources (Bodin & Crona, 2009). Nonetheless, three key objectives of network theories 
remain crucial in understanding how governance reforms shape elite incentives in the extractive 
sector: The first relates to an interest in the distribution of power among different actors within 
particular networks. Power is viewed as an actor’s ability to produce intended effects on the 
attitudes and behaviors of other actors and it emerges from networks where valued information 
and scarce resources are transferred from one actor to the other (cf. Knoke, 1994:156). A common 
assumption here is that given the centrality of elites in the position of power, they are better situated 
to exert influences over other actors and are better positioned to access valuable information which 
may put them at an advantage. Although power and information asymmetries remain crucial 
aspects of the centrality of elites, the extent to which they are wielded by elites to drive specific 
reforms are contingent on the dynamic of interactions with other actors.            
The second dimension of social network theory, therefore, underscores the importance of 
the interconnections between elites and non-elites (Bodin & Crona, 2009). Here, it is commonly 
argued that when elites enjoy a reasonable measure of cohesion and centralization, they are able 
to effectively drive reforms that may resonate with other actors. However, uneven distribution of 
the ties between elite and non-elites around reforms raise important normative questions about 
legitimacy and representation. The third aspect of social network theory is the view that networks 
are forged and conditioned in the context of specified policy domains – sectors around which 
different actors coalesce and interact (Knoke & Burleigh, 1989; Knoke, 1994). Within the 
extractive sector, attention to specified policy domains have led to a great deal of attention to 
assemblages and production networks that form part of a complex web of competing globalized 
market and governance processes, alongside varying bureaucratic and institutionalized processes 
which are continuously negotiated by different actors at multiple scales to shape the value creation 
processes of specific resources (Appel, Mason, & Watts, 2015; Huber, 2015; Watts, 2004). As we 
show below, the dynamic of specific extractive domains and the distributional contentions that 
they generate tend to expose and reinforce elite power and vulnerabilities over other actors. 
          To achieve the goal of understanding the politics of the EITI through the prism of elite and 
social network theories, we highlight the multiple ways by which the initiative shapes structures 
of elite domination and how elites, in turn, navigate the constraints that it imposes. Our position is 
that whereas the EITI has proven beneficial in building a strong network around reform that have 
enabled information sharing and legitimized reforms in the extractive sector, its influence on the 
structures of domination has been generally weak. Hence, the success of the EITI in Ghana aligns 
with the importance that elites attach to it as an effective instrument of domination and 
legitimation. This observation aligns with a general pattern of elite instrumentalization in Ghana 
and elsewhere, where commitments to specific reforms and the proliferation of multiple 
governance arrangements are used as tools for stabilizing regimes of accumulation and the power 




Methodology and data collection methods  
 
In seeking to understand elite incentives and dynamics in Ghana’s oil sector, we adopted a 
case study design for a more in-depth assessment of the phenomenon under investigation. Many 
of the recently published empirical work on the oil sector have been case studies (see Andrews, 
2013; Ayelazuno, 2014; Ofori & Lujala, 2015; Ayanoore, 2017; Siakwah, 2018; Oppong, 2016, 
2018 etc.). In our case, we used it in order to accentuate the exploratory focus of the research 
(Creswell & Poth, 2017), especially considering the existing knowledge gaps in the connections 
between the EITI, institutional innovation and elite dynamics in the petroleum sector. 
In addition to a combination of secondary sources, this article utilizes information from 
primary data gathered as part of field research conducted in 2013 and 2016: The first round of 
fieldwork was undertaken in 2013 and entailed a variety of data sources from archival research, 
unobtrusive observation of three EITI Dissemination Workshops and stakeholder workshops. Elite 
interviews with 117 respondents sampled from the Ghana EITI Secretariat, parliament, the Energy 
and Natural Resources Ministry, the Administrator of Stool Lands,1 Ghana Chamber of Mines, 
along with individual consultants, extractive firms, donor agencies, NGO and community activists 
and think tanks that are linked to the petroleum sector.  The second fieldwork was conducted in 
2016 between May and August with a focus on six communities in the Western Region (i.e. Axim, 
Busua, Dixcove, Cape Three Points, Sekondi-Takoradi and Ngyiresia) where two data collection 
instruments (i.e. semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions) were used to solicit 
responses to our research questions. In total, 84 participants were involved in the fieldwork 
including community stakeholders and those working with international organizations, local and 
transnational oil companies, government agencies, media houses and academic institutions.  
Most of the interviews and focus groups discussions were recorded with consent from 
participants. Transcripts from these recordings were subsequently subjected to many rounds of 
intense reading to identify common themes and patterns. These were augmented with field notes 
from observations, media reports and the extant literature to gain a much deeper understanding of 
the critical themes and discourses underpinning patterns that needed to be highlighted. The two 
larger projects that inform the paper engaged with a variety of themes around institutions, power 
structures, political settlements, community development and well-being, poverty, corporate social 
responsibility, norms and governance, donor influence, social accountability, participation and 
exclusion, and socio-ecological impacts among others. These themes, which were utilized in the 
coding of the qualitative data, forms part of the thematic analysis that helped us to both reduce the 
data and identify key ideas that are relevant across the bigger dataset (Clarke & Braun, 2014). 
However, key insights are specifically drawn from discussions around institutions, power 
structures, norms, governance, political settlements and donor influence – particularly as they 
relate to understanding the behaviour of elites in promoting and implementing transparency norms 
such as the EITI. This emphasis informs why, although the two projects described underpin the 
analysis in the paper, only a subset of fieldwork data is used in terms of direct references and 
quotations.  
 
                                               
1 The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands is a statutory body that is mandated to collect and disburse 
revenues deriving from customary lands in Ghana. The country’s mining regime, the Office receives all ground rents 
related to stool lands and manages disbursements to stools in mining communities. 
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EITI and the Makings of Ghana’s Governance Complex 
 
A common assumption among political economists is that there is a trade-off between binding 
arrangements that permit reform and the consolidation of elite dominance and control (for instance, 
Nye, 2011). Ghana’s experience, however, reflects a broader trend whereby commitments to 
reform are deployed to reinforce elite control and legitimation, as evinced by the wider 
characterizations of extraversion or partial reform syndrome in the Africanist literature (see de 
Oliveira, 2007, 2011; van de Walle, 2001, 2003; Lindberg, 2007).  While noting the influential 
role of critical actors, such as donors and policy experts (see Libby, 1976; Whitfield, 2005), a 
common theme underscored by various analysts of Ghana’s policy landscape is the appetite of the 
country’s ruling elites for pursuing different reform initiatives largely as instrument of power 
consolidation (see Gibson, 1997; Oelbaum, 2002; Owusu, 1970, 1996). Recent studies (e.g. 
Abdulai, 2017; Ayanoore, 2017) augment this extant literature. In particular, Ayanoore (2017) 
shows how elite institutional reform in oil sector is driven and shaped by clientelist power relations. 
In essence, there is a proactive political commitment to governance and broader developmental 
reforms as a result of the expected elite bargains from such endeavours. The country’s compliance 
with the EITI, which began in 2004 with the New Patriotic Party (NPP) Government, led by then 
President John Kuffuor, generally reflects this broader pattern of elite instrumentalization. This 
policy choice was invariably shaped by a plethora of domestic and external forces that exposed 
elite vulnerabilities in the extractive sector. 
          Globally, the 21st century marked a critical turning point for the extractive industry, as 
various activists and ‘norm entrepreneurs’ pushed for reforms that expanded the governance 
frontiers from the previous focus on security of access and production towards the pursuit of 
sustainability, transparency and accountability norms (see Benner, de Oliveira, & Kalinke, 2010; 
Gillies, 2010; Shankleman, 2009). In Ghana, as recounted by Oppong (2018), this global trend 
resonated with an evolving landscape of extractive activism as sporadic community agitations, 
along with a plethora of unilateral and collective campaigns by NGOs such as the National 
Coalition on Mining, the Publish What You Pay Coalition and the Wassa Amenfi Association of 
Communities Affected by Mining, provoked contentious debates over the developmental 
prospects of mining communities and the negative effects of poor corporate practices on the 
sustainable livelihoods and the environment. As heavy-handed military action and disparate policy 
interventions failed to address the issues raised by these campaigns, the Ghanaian government 
came under pressure to effect policy changes that could support mining investments and build trust 
with mining communities. 
          The vulnerabilities of the ruling elite which were exposed by NGOs and community activists 
were compounded by a severe deterioration of the Ghanaian economy due to a strain in 
government-donor relations over compliance with IMF conditionalities in the run up to the 2000 
general elections. During this election year, the crisis culminated into rising inflation, depreciation 
of the national currency, acute shortage of foreign currency and stalled economic growth, 
estimated at 3.7% (Government of Ghana, 2001). Within the extractive sector, there was a gaping 
hole in donor engagement when the World Bank withdrew its engagements following an 
unsuccessful implementation of the Natural Resource Management Project (1998-2003), based on 
what the Bank considered as a number of weaknesses in the governance regime of the mining 
sector, including a ‘slow and uneven progress on policy reform’  (World Bank-IEG, 2014). 
          To address these challenges, President Kuffuor, who assumed office in January 2001 in the 
first democratic turn-over in Ghana, rolled out a strategy to win back donor support and foreign 
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investment based on Ghana’s commitment to good governance reforms. As part of this strategy, 
for instance, the Government charged the Foreign Ministry and diplomatic missions abroad with 
the “promotion of Ghana as an important partner in good governance and a haven for private sector 
investment”(Government of Ghana, 2002). This was backed by numerous engagements, directly 
spearheaded by the President, such as participation in the Africa Peer Review Mechanism and the 
Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative. The launch of the GHEITI became critical in sustaining 
the revival in donor engagements, while raising the country’s investment profile for the extractive 
industry (see Government of Ghana, 2002). A high-ranking member of the NPP Government 
confirmed this point in a speech when he observed: “It is hoped that a transparent Extractive 
Industry in Ghana will bring about an improved investment climate by providing clear signal to 
investors and the international community, especially financial institutions that the Government of 
Ghana is committed to these reforms (for) greater transparency.”2  
          As a reform tool in Ghana, the EITI took on more political significance as an effective tool 
of policy instrumentation in the extractive sector. Globally, as noted by Pogge (2002), the tendency 
for high-yielding natural resources to centralize the extraction and distribution of rents around 
incumbent elites is reinforced by an intricate set of ‘privileges’ accorded governments based on 
territorial sovereignty over natural resources, irrespective of normative orientations and wider 
distributional outcomes. In Ghana, the institutional expression of this governmental ‘privilege’ is 
given under Article 256 (7) of the 1992 Constitution which vests the control and management of 
all natural resources in the President on behalf of the citizenry. By embracing the EITI, the 
Ghanaian government showed a rare willingness to share its core governance mandate over natural 
resources with different stakeholders.  
          As a prelude to commercial crude oil production, which began in January 2011 with the 
lifting of approximately 649,064 barrels of crude from the Jubilee Fields (GNPC, 2011), Ghana 
underwent an astonishing transition from EITI inception to one of its global star performers. In 
2004, barely a year after launching GHEITI, the Government inaugurated a 16-member National 
Steering Committee with representatives from domestic NGOs, trade unions, companies and 
mining communities. Three years later, when Ghana announced the discovery of commercial oil, 
the country was designated an ‘EITI Candidate’ – a temporary affirmation of good progress under 
the revised EITI validation grid – with four aggregated reports covering the mining sector. At the 
end of 2010, Ghana went through Validation – the main quality assurance mechanism of the 
international EITI secretariat – and was confirmed as the second “EITI Compliant” country in 
Africa. Within the global EITI community, GHEITI also attracted visibility for some notable 
country-level variations in sub-national auditing and disclosure of disaggregated and process data 
(Oppong, 2018). For instance, the Terms of Reference for the aggregator contained requirements 
for “process and financial audit” as well as “analysis of “historical documentation on production, 
exports and payment of royalties for minerals produced in the country” (Boas & Associates, 2006). 
The strong elements of qualitative and contextual information, as claimed by various respondents 
who were involved in GHEITI inception during field interviews, later proved influential in pushing 
the EITI standard beyond its initial focus on revenues and payments. 
Nonetheless, concerns were equally raised about the inability of GHEITI to venture into 
noticeable areas of elite patronage, including disbursements to traditional authorities (see IDL 
Group & Synergy Global, 2010:30). Indeed, many studies have confirmed that payments from 
mineral revenues to traditional councils and stools often suffer embezzlement and tend to finance 
                                               
2 Welcome statement by Hon. Dr Anthony Osei Akoto (MP), Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. 
Speech delivered at the EITI National Workshop La Palm Beach Hotel Accra, January 15, 2007, 
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expenditures other than those that benefit local communities (ICMM, 2007:23; Standing, 
2014:77). These criticisms were also accentuated by some weaknesses inherent in the EITI’s 
institutional design, including the dominance of government representatives, the absence of any 
mechanisms for public inputs and feedback from the National Steering Committee, and the lack 
of any binding legislation to govern and enforce EITI findings (see Oppong, 2016). Also, beyond 
the vague representation of stakeholders, GHEITI does not have any formal linkage with 
enforceable channels offered by state institutions like the legislature and the Office of the Auditor-
General. Our field interviews with various Members of Parliament in 2013, for instance, revealed 
that none of the GHEITI reports had been the subject of parliamentary deliberations, not least by 
the Public Accounts Committee, the Mines and Energy Committee and Finance Committee. 
Respondents from the GHEITI Secretariat and Steering Committee also admitted that GHEITI 
reports go to “no one,” except the “general public” (personal interviews, 2013). 
While the inception of extractive reforms under the EITI in Ghana was largely elite-driven, 
it served an important tool for nurturing a stakeholder coalition for the deployment of good 
governance norms in the extractive sector. This process, to a large extent, reflects a predominant 
reform mantra that upholds the importance of private governance networks and multi-stakeholder 
deliberations in addressing the challenges of resource-led development on the basis of shared 
mandate between governments, NGOs and firms (Bracking, 2009; Dashwood & Puplampu, 2015; 
Falkner, 2003; Koechlin & Calland, 2009; Van Alstine & Andrews, 2016). As envisaged by social 
network theory, the cohesiveness and representativeness of such stakeholder networks often 
enables elites to build legitimacy to effectively drive reforms. In Ghana, the introduction of these 
reform initiatives received the strong backing of elites and birthed a governance complex, 
characterised by a multiplicity and, sometimes, duplicity of multi-stakeholder reform initiatives. 
The governance turn has proven beneficial for incorporating some new actors into, hitherto, 
enclosed policy spaces in the extractive sector. However, questions remain as to whether the ruling 
elites have relinquished control or rather exploited the new networks, reputational leverage, and 
institutional loopholes in initiatives, like the EITI. The discovery of oil, and the ensuing interest in 
creating new initiatives added another boost to this governance complex and elite 
instrumentalization as various donors, NGOs, companies and public sector agencies rolled out 
several initiatives to build competitive edge in what quickly became a competitive arena for the 
introduction of new ideas. 
The Governance Complex, EITI and Elite Politics 
 
Among its initial implications, the EITI in Ghana proved influential in nurturing a 
compelling governance complex that webbed key policy makers with activists, trade unions, 
NGOs, donor agencies, and business actors in the extractive sector. In line with the premium that 
resource curse theorists place on quality institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006; de Medeiros Costa et 
al., 2013), Ghana’s oil discovery has kickstarted a governance boom as part of the reform needed 
to ensure efficiency, transparency and accountability. This governance boom is marked by a 
complex dynamic of multiple reform initiatives that have been instrumental reinforcing the 
centrality of elites, while institutionalising norms that legitimise policy choices in the petroleum 
sector. 
          As highlighted in Table 1 below, commercial oil discovery opened a new phase in extractive 
sector reform which amplified the governance coalition that was nurtured earlier by the EITI.  In 
what quickly developed into a competitive arena for new governance initiatives, various donors, 
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NGOs, companies, and think tanks jostled for visibility in the petroleum landscape by rolling out 
individual and collaborative programmes geared towards making oil work for Ghana. Notably, 
under the auspices of the influential donors, including DFID, GIZ and UNDP, the Ghanaian 
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Kingdom of Norway largely to 
dispense what was considered as Norway’s exemplar expertise towards Ghana’s national oil and 
gas policy strategy (Government of Ghana & Kingdom of Norway, 2008). The World Bank also 
rolled out a US$55 million Oil and Gas Capacity Building Project to build new institutions, such 
as the Petroleum Commission – the main regulator for the upstream sector, while supporting 
agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Energy Ministry (personal interview 
with World Bank petroleum expert, 2016). Focusing on communities, DFID established the 
Western Regional Coastal Foundation (WRCF) to promote multi-stakeholder engagements in the 
coastal communities in close proximity to offshore oil extraction. An informant from GIZ also 
indicated that, since the oil find, the agency has rolled out more than 13 different projects solely 
for ‘technical assistance’ (personal interview, 2016). 
           
Table 1: Summary/Timeline of Governance Boom in Ghana’s Oil Sector, 2007-2018  
 
Year Action/Activities Key Actors 
2007 Major oil finds in the Western Region  
Ghana becomes EITI candidate country 
Ghanaian civil society organize national conference on 
EITI implementation 
 




Civil society groups 
2008 National Oil for Development Conference Government of Ghana 
Kingdom of Norway 
2009 Annual Convention on Oil and Gas by Research and 
Advocacy Organizations  
Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG) 
established 
Civil society groups 
Donor organizations 
2009 Government of Ghana adopts a memo extending the 
EITI into the petroleum sector  
Government of Ghana 
GHEITI Secretariat 
2010 Oil production commences 
Ghana receives designation as EITI compliant country 
Local content policy framework unveiled 







2011 Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) launches the 
Petroleum Transparency and Accountability Index (P-
TRAC)  
Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) 815 
passed 
Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) 
established by PRMA 815 
Draft EITI Bill (mandatory framework) released by 
Government 
$55 million oil and gas capacity building project began 
Parliamentarians 
Ministers 
Civil society groups 





Petroleum Commission established by an Act of 
Parliament to replace GNPC as regulatory body for the 
upstream sector 
2013 Local content law (L.I. 2204) established Parliamentarians 
Ministries  
2014 DFID-funded Western Region Coastal Foundation 
established to undertake multi-stakeholder engagement 
in the coastal districts 
DFID (U.K.) 
District authorities 
2015 The PRMA amended in June to provide a better 
framework for the management of petroleum revenues 
DFID-funded Ghana Oil and Gas for Inclusive Growth 
(GOGIG) programme launched to help engineer the oil 




2016 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (Act 919) 
passed 




EITI Secretariat (in 
Oslo) 
2018 Petroleum Register launched to disclose all full 
agreements and contracts in the upstream petroleum 
sector ratified by Ghana’s Parliament 
Ministers 
Civil society groups 
(e.g. ACEP) 
 
Donor engagements coalesced around an energetic civil society and corporate activism 
around transparency and accountability norms. Notable amongst them was the Civil Society 
Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG) comprising about 110 research and advocacy organisations 
who pushed for the incorporation of good governance principles in the governance of the 
petroleum industry. These national-level NGO activities were accompanied by a series of 
initiatives within various communities, especially those in the Western region. Organisations such 
as Friends of the Nation, the Western Region Development Working Group by the Nana Kobina 
Nketsia IV Trust, and recently the Regional Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Platform, have been at 
the forefront of promoting institutionalised mechanisms of community participation in the oil 
industry.3 Petroleum firms also enjoy some visibility in this governance complex through various 
CSR projects and participation in various participatory forums. For instance, their community CSR 
outreaches are expected to draw upon the multi-stakeholder activities of the WRCF (personal 
interview with WRCF governance lead, 2016).  
          The boon in governance initiatives invariably set the tenor for a raft of legislative and policy 
reforms pursued by the Ghanaian government, including the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
(PRMA) 815, the Petroleum Commission Act, Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) 
Regulations, 2013 (L.I. 2204), and the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (Act 919) – all 
of which were established over a span of five years since oil production began (i.e. between 2011 
to 2016). Encoded in these laws were different provisions for the institutionalisation of governance 
norms, including the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) – a statutory body 
comprising representatives of various non-state citizens’ groups and companies with the mandate 
to oversee the management and use of petroleum revenues. The extension of the EITI into the 
                                               
3 See “A Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Platform for W/R Formed” http://vibeghana.com/2014/02/20/a-multi-
stakeholder-dialogue-platform-for-wr-formed/  (accessed 20/02/14); Communique Western Region Development 
Forum. Meeting held from 24th to 25th September 2010. Takoradi 
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petroleum sector by the then National Democratic Congress (NDC) in 2009, in fulfilment of a 
manifesto promise during the 2008 general election, added to the list of governance commitments 
by the ruling elites for the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in the governance landscape of 
petroleum in Ghana.  
          The PIAC, for instance, is crucial because it represents a domestication of some of the 
principles embedded in the global EITI agenda. One of the many contentions around the 
constitution of PIAC related to the categorisation of citizens’ groups that were identified for 
representation on its Committee (see Oppong, 2016). The inclusion of members who appear, on 
face value, remotely connected to the extractive industry begs the question; why are they interested 
in norms advanced by initiatives, such as PWYP and EITI? The answer to this question further 
augments our argument around elite instrumentalization in transparency norm diffusion. For 
instance, the case of representation of religious councils on PIAC was particularly curious given 
that they were less visible in various campaigns in the extractive sector. However, as affirmed by 
Takyi et al. (2010), and demonstrated by prayers by prominent religious leaders at almost every 
national event, religion is an important aspect of Ghana’s political economy. This point has been 
dramatized more recently by the decision of the current NPP Government, led by President 
Akuffo-Addo, to build a controversial National Cathedral to the ‘glory of God’ (Ghanaweb 2018). 
This evidence further accentuates the particular power of Christian values in Ghana’s politics (with 
Christians constituting over 70% of the population) and why political pressure from such groups 
may have led to this intended project as opposed to a multitude of other development-oriented 
endeavours the funds committed to building the cathedral could have been used for.  
          In essence, the power of religious elites, in addition to their perceived moral upstanding, 
invariably explains why they would be included in normative mechanisms meant to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. Being regarded as one of the most 
religious countries in Africa (Pew 2010), the presence of these religious stakeholders on PIAC 
seeks to safeguard the country’s reputation and further justify the impetus of adopting norms of 
‘good’ governance. Yet, fieldwork discussions revealed that these endeavours have also been used 
as a mechanism by the ruling elites to incorporate civil society, private sector networks and other 
leading voices into an elite network in order to maintain the stability of and ‘popular’ support for 
the system that supports such power relations (personal interviews with journalist and policy 
expert, 2016). This means that the presence of respected religious representatives on the PIAC, in 
their respective capacities as ‘non-political’ elites, and their involvement in broader institutional 
innovation primarily serves as an outward endorsement of the normative endeavour as something 
that is ‘good’.  
          In line with Haufler’s (2010) earlier observation about how the EITI tends to embed itself 
in other institutions, GHEITI complements the governance complex in the petroleum sector, 
reflecting its strengths and weaknesses. Like various stakeholder initiatives, the participatory 
synergies between the EITI have posed a formidable countervailing force against the centrality of 
political elites in the management of the petroleum industry. This has augmented the level of 
scrutiny of policy decisions and institutionalised transparency norms that continue to address 
information asymmetries in the sector. During our field interviews, for instance, an informant from 
the Energy Ministry averred that for the government and civil society activists, EITI reports have 
become ‘Bibles’ that inform advocacy and were the ‘the tools or justifications for government to 
undertake a number of reforms of the fiscal regime, reporting processes, and monitoring of 
companies (personal interview, 2013). The EITI has also tapped into some of areas of elite 
vulnerability, afforded by democratic pluralism and civic activism in Ghana, to maintain its 
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relevance in the petroleum sector. As recounted by a leading civil society activist and member of 
GHEITI in an interview, the commitment to expand the Initiative into the petroleum sector by then 
opposition NDC during the 2008 elections was due to intense lobbying by local NGOs, following 
the then NPP Government’s resistance to the proposal (personal interview, 2013). As outlined by 
various informants and official documents from GHEITI, this enhanced scrutiny and the close 
linkages with political elites have yielded some notable results in reforms that have guaranteed an 
open data on traditionally enclosed aspects of the industry such as contracting, beneficial 
ownership, and revenue disbursements (see GHEITI, 2018). 
          While the countervailing forces and policy networks forged by the EITI in Ghana remain 
significant, its continued salience has been premised on the centrality of political elites, who have 
successfully managed its implementation to bolster their influence over the petroleum sector. The 
Ghanaian Government asserted its control from the onset of the EITI process during an impasse 
with the donor community over the appointment of the auditing firm for the first GHEITI 
aggregation report. While the World Bank requested the Government to appoint an external 
aggregator, in line with “international requirements” (cf. IDL Group & Synergy Global, 2010:26), 
the Government maintained that the appointment should rather conform to the national Public 
Procurement Law of 2003 and a preference for local experts with grounded insights about Ghana’s 
extractive sector (interview with current and former NSC members, 2013). The Government took 
advantage of the World Bank’s refusal to fund the initial GHEITI auditing process, and the 
polarisation among donors (as GIZ, for instance, supported the local efforts), to enhance its 
leverage over GHEITI. The strong elite backing that the EITI enjoys in Ghana, reflected in the 
support it has received from successive governments,4 typifies the incentive structure which has 
compounded its weaknesses, while enhancing its influence as an effective tool of elite 
instrumentalization.  
The stark manifestations of this ‘winner-takes-all’ tendency in Ghana’s institutional make-
up, as acknowledged by an informant from the media, are encircled by elites dominance and 
determines “who gets hired, who gets licences to work in the industry” (personal interview with 
journalist, 2016). As demonstrated by the absolute control over natural resources, Ghana’s political 
system, which largely centralises political authority around an Executive President in areas ranging 
from appointments to resource allocation, ranks among the most severe frailties of petroleum 
governance in the country (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). Notably, the Ghanaian constitution, 
under Article 108, requires all laws that would cause a charge on the Consolidated Fund or the 
public funds of Ghana to emanate from, on behalf of, the President. In addition to fuelling what 
Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012) observed as “vitriolic” and “polarising” politics that feed into 
political patronage, these frailties have significantly weakened parliamentary oversight. 
Consequently, as part of the restructuring that culminated into GHEITI’s expansion into the 
petroleum industry, the number of government representatives on the National Steering Committee 
increased with representation from the Offices of the President and Vice President. Besides, the 
absence of a binding legislation and poor linkages with independent oversight public institutions 
and the legislature, as Oppong (2018:11) argues, implies that the EITI operates largely on the 
goodwill of dominant elites.  
          From the discussion so far, it appears that while offering important levers for transparency 
and legitimation of the reforms that form part of the governance complex of the oil industry, the 
EITI has been less influential in altering the landscape for elite behaviour in Ghana. This 
                                               
4 Since Ghana returned to democratic rule in 19992, there have been three alternations of power between the New 
Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress; 2001, 2009, and 2017.  
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observation reflects a number of critical points related to debates about the politics of reform in 
the petroleum industry and the long-held view about elite instrumentalization of policy processes 
in Ghana. The first relates to the sub-optimal outcomes that are upheld by the ‘resource curse’ 
literature as generic to petroleum resources. As the number of corrective measures meant to arrest 
the corrosive effects of resource abundance, an assemblage of experts, activists, policy makers and 
industry players have come to dominate the policy domain, often dispensing technocratic norms 
in low-income resource-rich countries. As poignantly demonstrated by the experience of the now 
discredited Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Agreement (Massey & May, 2005), the failure of these 
corrective measures to grapple with the contentious politics that are often engendered by resource 
extraction, have permitted and legitimized the extension of the state and elite centrality in 
extractive policy domains. 
          As noted by Chalfin (2015), in the case of maritime boundary delimitation in the oil sector, 
through a combination of enclosure and repossession strategies that have mapped out domains of 
state sovereignty, Ghanaian policy elites have extended the domains of sovereignty and influence. 
Philips et. al. (2015)  have also demonstrated how sovereignty, accorded state elites over extractive 
governance, is used by state elites to undermine ‘good governance’ reforms (see also de Oliveira, 
2007; van de Walle, 2001). This trend of elite instrumentalization in the petroleum sector is 
compounded Ghana’s ‘winner-takes-all’ democratic politics (personal interview with NPP official, 
2016). The winner-takes-all politics is underscored by the perpetuation of a pseudo multi-party 
democracy in principle which has, in practice, been a fierce contestation between two main 
political parties (i.e. NPP and NDC) and their elite networks since Ghana entered its constitutional 
regime in 1992. Here, many analysts have argued that despite reaping the “low-hanging” fruits of 
competitive elections and respect for civic and political rights, there are still challenges in 
improving democratic quality especially in terms enhancing the accountability and responsiveness 
of governments, as well as broad-based citizens’ participation in Ghana (cf. Gyimah-Boadi, 
2015:103). Consequently, considerable frustration has been voiced against the EITI for its failure 
to effectively tackle the multiple sources that cumulate into elite power in Ghana. Notably, results 
of the nation-wide consultation for the Petroleum Revenue Management Law revealed a broader 
national preference for an independent and homegrown alternative to the EITI, which led to the 
establishment of PIAC (see Amoako-Tuffuor, 2011; Parliament of Ghana, 2010a; personal 
interview with PIAC co-chair, 2016). Also, during interviews with some representatives of 
petroleum companies, they expressed support for more direct community engagements instead of 
compliance with the EITI, which they found as duplicating of PIAC, and ill-suited for the oil 
industry (also, GHEITI Secretariat, 2014). By not targeting the basis of elite power and influence, 
the EITI is increasingly becoming less aligned with the supposed reform imperatives of the 
petroleum industry, as voiced by the broader citizenry and, in particular, the people who live in 
coastal communities that are closer to offshore oil extraction. This has significant implications for 




It follows from the preceding discussion that while offering important levers for the 
legitimation and inclusion of reforms in the petroleum governance complex, the EITI has been less 
influential in altering the landscape of elite behavior in Ghana. This observation has a broader 
resonance that reflects the constraints imposed by the material politics around oil-led development 
and elite dynamics in Ghana.  Overall, the institutional innovation and the governance complex 
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discussed in this paper reveal the broader globalized assemblage of actors and structures that 
inform the industry, which sheds light on the utility of both elite theory and social network theory 
in understanding the politics of resource extraction and governance reforms. The discussion 
underpins the fact that simplistic propositions of harms and benefits along the lines of mainstream 
resource curse theorizing are not novel (Ayelazuno 2014; Siakwah 2018), neither can we assume 
that the transparency or disclosure that is achieved through the institutionalization of the EITI and 
other governance mechanisms is necessarily advancing some of the core challenges around the 
resource-development nexus. 
          Taking together, it seems quite baffling how a small (but growing) sector will attract such 
tremendous interest in its governance arena. In some sense, the fear of the ‘resource curse’ has 
contributed to such rapid institutional innovation in Ghana. However, in order to further explain 
this phenomenon, we have postulated some reasons why there has been a sustained boom in 
governance arrangements to support the implementation of the EITI – including the initiative 
serving as a mechanism for elite instrumentalization. The discussions in the preceding sections 
show that the network of elite actors involved in the oil sector are not merely idyllic ‘norm takers’ 
but are in fact playing an active role in the extent to which norms around transparency and 
accountability are constructed and distributed. This active role in the construction and distribution 
of normative arrangements ensure that the power structures that stabilize and legitimate elite 
politics are perpetuated. This, we argue, is among the core reasons why the EITI, despite its 
successes, has served as an instrument for elite domination in Ghana’s oil sector.   
          Having said that, our focus on elite dynamics and our definition of elites as powerful 
networks that have decisive control over the organization of society does not seek to suggest that 
‘bottom-up’ forces have not played an equally significant role in the governance complex 
surrounding the oil sector. Quite the contrary, the agency of these grassroots forces has seen 
materialization in the activities of several civil society organisations such as the Civil Society 
Platform on Oil and Gas, Africa Centre for Energy Policy and PWYP-Ghana. Nonetheless, the 
complexity of institutional innovation in the oil sector has made it possible for these organizations 
to work in tandem with forces that seek to use the same institutional mechanisms to advance elite 
domination and legitimation while achieving certain reformist agendas that receive the general 
buy-in of the actors involved. This finding aligns with our theoretical position that elite influence 
does not necessarily emanate from those who wield direct political power – considering the 
broader social networks that those who operate from the ‘bottom up’ belong to and how powerful 
such networks can be in contesting or endorsing certain institutional reforms. Nonetheless, the 
characterisation of the EITI and the overall governance complex that underpins institutional 
innovation in Ghana illuminates how instrumental politics and the limits of the technocratic reform 
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